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Abstract 
The present paper is part of a larger research project that looked at the reality of the 
paramilitary phenomenon in Eastern Europe (Slovakia), in particular at the influence of 
the so-called “refugee crisis” on the creation and maintenance of paramilitary groups in 
the country. This paper introduces the Slovenskí Branci (Slovak Recruits) unit as a case 
study of the motivations of recruits to engage in paramilitary activities. The recruits’ 
reasons, as well as the attraction of violence and the perceived need for social defense 
will be studied here. With respect to methodology, the analysis is conducted from the 
point of view of cultural criminology. The research question for this paper is “Why have 
recruits in Slovenskí Branci decided to join the paramilitary group?”. Overall, the reasons 
given by the recruits for participating in paramilitary activities can be divided into the 
need to defend the homeland against perceived invaders, based on nationalism and 
ontological insecurity, and the attractiveness of militarism for the people involved in the 
group. 
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1. Introduction 
“When the people and the nation are in danger and the state is not willing to stand 
up whatsoever, someone must do something”2. It is a bright and warm day in Nitra, in the 
Nitra region, in Slovakia. I am with PS (23), a university student who decided to join 
Slovenskí Branci around 2015. We are waiting over a coffee for the other recruits to join 
us in the parking lot in front of the train station in order to get in the cars and go to Zirany, 
a smaller village where the trainings usually take place. PS explains that, for him and 
many other recruits, Slovenskí Branci is a family rather than just a hobby. They share 
some ideals and have a common goal: to protect their homeland against any invader or 
enemy, be it from inside or outside the country. Later on, during the training, NK, one of 
the main instructors in Slovenskí Branci, tells me that there are around 200 members in 
Slovenskí Branci throughout Slovakia. They all train according to Slovak military 
knowledge, and so share the same military discipline and tactics. In addition, every unit 
conducts what they call “eco-actions” in their towns or villages, according to the area’s 
needs, for example, cleaning the forest or picking up trash from rural areas. 
Slovenskí Branci is part of the international paramilitarism scene. Ranging from 
Latvia to Hungary, paramilitary groups can be found throughout Eastern Europe. While 
in Poland paramilitary groups are supported and helped by the State, in order to be 
prepared for a hypothetical Russian advance into its territory, in countries like Czech 
Republic, Slovakia or Hungary, paramilitary groups are not openly supported. In the 
Slovak case, Slovenskí Branci has been characterized as a possible security threat to the 
country given certain aspects of its ideology.3 In this sense, Slovenskí Branci promotes 
and defends a pan-Slavic ideology, that is, an ideology that argues for the unification of 
                                                 
2 PS, Slovenskí Branci recruit, interview. Zirany, May 2017. 
3 Daniel Milo, senior researcher at Globsec and former advisor for the Slovak Ministry of Interior 
(interview, Bratislava, June 2017). Even though Slovenskí Branci might be a security threat, the 
organization is not considered to be as extremist and dangerous as the far-right party L’SNS (Popular 
Party Our Slovakia) or other organizations such as Vzdor Kysuce (Defense Kysuce). 
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Slavic countries in order to prevent them from losing their cultural heritage to Europe and 
the West. Therefore, Slovenskí Branci needs to be framed in a globalized context. Notions 
such as multiculturalism- and migration-, feminism or LGBTQ rights are perceived as a 
threat to the Slovak traditional values. These are understood in terms of the traditional 
Christian family, traditional masculinities and a defense of the homeland. Personal 
motives, then, need to be framed within the larger context of the global political climate 
in the EU. The Slovak government is known for its reluctance to adhere to European 
policies in refugee distribution quotas. Besides, a certain anti-EU feeling is growing in 
Slovak society.4 Although the Slovak state has some euro-skeptic views coinciding with 
Slovenskí Branci, the paramilitary group does not adhere to the state’s discourse nor does 
the state support the paramilitary group in any respect. 
Slovenskí Branci, defined as a civic militia, became notorious in the Slovak media 
after their lessons in schools about military training and weapon handling went viral. 
Furthermore, Slovenskí Branci carried out several vigilante activities, of which patrolling 
the refugee camp in Gabcíkovo, the city of Piest’any and a small rural area in Trnava are 
representative, insofar as those actions set out their will to control and guard Slovakian 
physical and symbolic borders.5 The organization was framed as just people running in 
the woods with fake weapons, but their actions suggest otherwise as Slovenskí Branci is 
becoming visible to the general public. 
 
2. Post-communist societies and security 
At this point, it is necessary to draw on Slovakia’s socio-cultural environment in 
order to give the reader some context to fully understand the socio-cultural environment 
                                                 
4 Interview Elena Gallova, social researcher at CVEK, Bratislava, June 2017. 
5 Patrolling the refugee camp during the migration crisis in 2015 meant, for some academics, a political 
stand equivalent to saying “We will protect Slovakia because we do not trust these foreigners and could 
be dangerous” (interview Pavol Struhár, PhD on Political Science, Trencin, May 2017). 
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of Slovenskí Branci. Slovakia’s recent history is marked by the shift from a communist 
system to a (neo)-liberal economy and society in a few decades, which impacted the 
country at many levels. For the present topic, it is interesting to look at the role of the 
state in matters of security after this transition.  
Kucera and Mareš (2015) write about the influence of the democratization process 
undergone by many countries in the East after the fall of Communism on vigilante 
tendencies and paramilitarism. From a dictatorial state, democratization meant the 
opening up of society and markets, which led to massive changes in security, policing, 
crime trends, etc. (Mareš, 2012; Kucera and Mareš, 2015). These authors suggest that in 
this process of opening up the state left some of its duties unfulfilled, for example, 
security. Their thesis is that the state enters into a security contract with its citizens by 
virtue of which, citizens abide by the rules and the state gets the monopoly of violence. 
Thus, when the state is not capable of honoring the contract, citizens tend to withdraw 
from it (Kucera and Mareš, 2015). Some of the reasons adduced are the under-preparation 
of the police force and the rise in crime. The researchers find that in a capitalistic market, 
opened up through democratization, the state needs to re-evaluate the expenditure on 
security, which used to be huge during the dictatorship. Moreover, post-Communist 
countries did see a rise in crime due to, authors argue (Kucera and Mareš, 2015), the loss 
of previously available social security. All of it could have contributed to the pervasive 
feeling within Slovenskí Branci of a failing state. 
These findings are in accordance with Nivette (2016) and the present case. The 
conditions of statelessness and illegitimacy of present Slovak institutions do play a role 
in Slovenskí Branci. People engaged in Slovenskí Branci have not completely withdrawn 
from the security contract, even though they find it strongly contested due to their view 
of an inadequate police force. Therefore, the role that Slovenskí Branci aims to achieve 
within Slovak society is that of the protector of traditional Slovak values, since the state 
is no longer willing or able to defend the nation. Slovenskí Branci adopts an anti-EU 
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discourse, also held by the Slovak government with regards to certain EU policies, in 
which supranational entities are a danger as they are perceived to threaten national 
sovereignty. 
 
3. Concepts of use 
Even though the way paramilitary groups are created varies among countries 
(Mareš and Stojar, 2012), the reasons remain the same: to protect the country from 
perceived enemies. The research question for this paper is: Why have recruits in Slovenskí 
Branci decided to join the paramilitary group? 
In order to answer this question, we first need to define two concepts, namely 
paramilitarism and ontological insecurity. 
Firstly, paramilitary refers to a group which is not military, but is organized and 
operates as such; they can be home guard units, vigilante groups or militias (Liedekerke, 
2016). 
Vigilantism, as defined in Johnston (1996), features six characteristics. The first 
one is the premeditation of those involved. In this sense, groups formed spontaneously, 
such as -lynching mobs- do not fall under this category. In second place, groups must be 
formed by “private agencies” (Johnston, 1996), meaning autonomous citizens not bound 
by a job contract or similar. Thirdly, in the same vein, the vigilante group cannot be 
supported by the state. The fourth characteristic is the use or threatened use of force. The 
fifth characteristic is that vigilante groups must react to crime or social deviance. 
Although the concept of social deviance is rather vague, it is to be understood here as 
deviance from social rules in any given society, which may vary through time and space. 
Classical vigilantism reacts to crime, while neo-vigilantism is dedicated to social control 
of perceived risky groups, in order to reassert social values. Vigilantism arises when there 
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is a perception of the establishment being under attack (Johnston, 1996), meaning that the 
state or nation could be victim of a variety of processes that threaten their existence. 
Finally, vigilantism is concerned with security as a “social good”, paramount to the social 
identity. Following these concepts, Slovenskí Branci is a vigilante group due to the fact 
that it is an established and organized group, formed by autonomous citizens who 
voluntarily decided to become involved, and does not receive the support of the state. 
They are a reaction to social deviance in the sense that they perceive a lack of commitment 
of the Slovak people to their country and this is a social behavior to be “corrected”. 
Similarly, they perceive Slovakia to be under attack from several actors, and it is their 
role to defy them. Finally, Slovenskí Branci is concerned with security as a primordial 
factor, since they claim that Slovakia might be in danger due to migration and 
globalization processes. They respond to a perceived social desire “to do something” 
when the state is seen as failing to provide for the perceived needs of the people. 
 The concept of ontological insecurity also needs to be delimited here. Ontological 
insecurity is a rather complex term used to describe the main feature of the late modern 
world: the lack of certainty in our everyday lives. As Giddens wrote (1990), ontological 
insecurity is the loss of confidence in the continuity of one’s self-identity and shared 
norms and values. In such a context, it is necessary to search for the meaning of our own 
life (van Marle and Maruna, 2010), which can be done in a variety of ways. Liberalization 
of markets and the commodification of every aspect of life, as well as the labor market 
conditions (Young, 2003), have a deep impact on everyday lives. These changes create 
deep feelings of precariousness (van Marle and Maruna, 2010), which stem from the 
multiplicity of choices, understood as consumerism, and which challenge established 
beliefs and certainties. In section 5 it will become clear what role the notion of ontological 
(in)security plays. 
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4. Method 
The research took place in Slovakia during the months of May and June 2017. It 
was conducted using ethnographic methods, namely semi-structured in-depth interviews 
and participant observation. 
I was based in Bratislava during the fieldwork period, although participant 
observation was carried out in Nitra, 100 kilometers away from the capital, since Nitra 
has one of the strongest squads of Slovenskí Branci in terms of numbers. It was a non-
continuous participant observation because the group usually meets every second Sunday 
in order to train. I was totally overt to the group in that every member of the squad knew 
that I was conducting research for a MA thesis in the Netherlands. I attended four training 
sessions of around six hours each. During those sessions I assumed the role of a 
participant observer, with the accent on observation instead of participation; I participated 
in exercises where no previous military training was needed, while I stayed aside and 
observed during those that needed such knowledge. Most of the time I walked with NK, 
the main instructor in Nitra, and talked to him, while observing the exercises of the 
recruits. However, I did take part in a shooting training, which allowed me to experience 
and understand the recruits’ feelings while training, obtaining the so-called 
criminological verstehen (Ferrell, 1997). In between those training sessions I conducted 
the interviews, both with academic experts and recruits willing to talk to me.  
The interviews were conducted in English, in Bratislava, Trenčin, region of 
Trnava (Central Slovakia), and Brno (Czech Republic), where I met with academic 
experts in the field. They were semi-structured in-depth interviews. After nine interviews, 
saturation point was reached. Interviews were held with three of the six main instructors 
of Slovenskí Branci, four academic experts and two recruits. Moreover, several informal 
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conversations were held with recruits during trainings.6 Topic lists included slightly 
different questions according to the respondents’ background and situation, in order to 
obtain the best quality information from them. At the end of the interviews there was an 
open question in case the respondents wanted to add something else. All the interviews 
were recorded with the oral consent of the interviewee. 
Data from interviews was analyzed through content analysis, following Davies, 
Francis and Jupp (2011). Every interview was transcribed and coded in order to be 
analyzed. Fieldwork notes were also coded. The codification was done in two steps. The 
first, deductive, was done with codes and concepts coming from within the data, emerging 
from it as the discourse develops. The second step, inductive, consisted of coding with 
concepts from the theories used.  
All the data from participant observation and interviews was analyzed with NVivo 
11. This allowed for a clear codification and created networks and correlations between 
the codes. 
Access to the group was firstly obtained through Facebook. I sent a message on 
the group’s Facebook site and initiated a conversation with NK, the main instructor in 
Slovenskí Branci. I was rapidly accepted into the group and, once on the ground, I got to 
talk to almost every member of the Nitra squad. This was possible thanks to the so-called 
“paradox of the outsider”. Being an outsider may be both an advantage and a disadvantage 
to enter a social group. In spite of not speaking Slovak and not being familiar with Slovak 
culture at that point and because I was an outsider, the group appeared open and willing 
to share their stories with me, since I was unbiased and not driven by information in the 
Slovak media. In the same vein, I was perceived as a member of a larger community to 
which recruits could relate, insofar as I am Western European, white and middle-class. 
                                                 
6 Interviewees were asked whether their names could appear in the present paper and they all agreed but 
one, who prefers to remain anonymous. However, real names have been changed in order to protect their 
privacy. 
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Therefore, since I was not perceived as an enemy in terms of culture nor was I biased 
because I am not Slovak, I was able to access the group quite easily. Besides, 
masculinities also played a role in the acceptance of the group. Being a man made my 
access easier, insofar as I was perceived as relatable by the members of the unit; apart 
from ethnicity, the only thing in common to members of the Nitra squad is gender. Except 
for two women, the squad is solely composed of white men.7 Trust was easily built during 
the research, both during the trainings and after them, as well as on some other occasions 
over drinks with some recruits. It might be the case, as Vincenová explained (interview, 
PhD researcher, May 2017), that for women it would be more difficult to address the 
group, since they might have to prove themselves more often than men. 
 
5. Reasons for becoming involved with a paramilitary group: Nation, glory 
and ultimate meaning 
 
“What is the age profile? How long do these people stay? What is the 
turnover? So, in a way, as far as I know, it’s a kind of revolving door, you 
know. You have people entering, some of them stay for longer period of 
time, but mostly they’ll leave after, say, they reach certain age, change 
their minds” (interview Daniel Milo, expert on policy making at 
GLOBSEC, June 2017).  
There has been little academic discussion about the people involved in Slovenskí 
Branci, leaving aside the discussion on the extremist elements present in the beginning of 
the group: 
“He [NK] also explains the anecdote he told the conscripts before, 
about a former member of the unit who went to Ukraine to fight. 
                                                 
7 This was the case for the fieldwork period: May and June 2017. 
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Apparently, this ex-member went to fight on the Ukrainian side but he 
was rejected, so he started to fight for the pro-Russian bloc. NK means 
with this that some extreme elements may get into the organization, but 
they are just that, elements that have no relation with the group’s 
ideology.” (Fieldwork notes, Zirany, June 2017)8 
“Some members would not tell the truth about their motivation to join, 
which could mean that they want to fight in Ukraine or the Middle East. 
Hence, Slovenskí Branci needs to be really careful when choosing 
members, since we do not want to have these elements among us.” 
(interview NK, Slovenskí Branci instructor, Bratislava, June 2017). 
Academic literature on paramilitarism in Eastern Europe has not paid much 
attention to the question of which individuals engage in vigilante activities or their 
motivations and reasons for joining.9 Although recruits are mostly young people, they are 
rather serious in their training and patrolling activities, as well as regarding the reasons 
behind them. Data from fieldwork suggest that there are different kinds of people 
involved in Slovenskí Branci. It is necessary to make a distinction here between people 
directly and non-directly involved, the latter commonly called ‘sympathizers’. 
People directly involved, recruits, are usually young people between 15 and 35 
years old.10 They all have very different backgrounds, ranging from students to police 
officers, ex-military members, firemen or businessmen. Recruits have in common their 
                                                 
8 The presence of such “extremist elements”, as part of far-right movements, who were present in the 
beginning of the group is acknowledged. They were expelled from the group after a few months, once it 
was clear that they did not have the same objectives, according to the founder of Slovenskí Branci. (PS, 
instructor and founder of Slovenskí Branci, interview, June 2017). 
9 There is research conducted on paramilitarism in Eastern Europe (Meseznikov & Bránik, 2017; 
Vincenová, 2015), but not from within as to understand individual realities and perceptions. 
10 The minimum age to join Slovenskí Branci is 15 years old. 
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love for their country and some ideological aspects found in the group’s system of ideas 
and views:  
“On our way back from the shooting range I talk to the youngest recruit; 
he is 15 and joined Slovenskí Branci 5 months ago, about December. He 
joined because “he likes the military and to be in nature”. 
Notwithstanding the short time he has been in the unit, he says that the 
Slovak army is not effective enough and not as big as it used to be; he 
has, therefore, not considered joining the professional army” (Fieldwork 
notes, Žirany, 2017). 
Drawing from terrorism literature, Cottee and Hayward’s work on “Terrorist 
emotives” (2011) might shed light on the reasons for becoming involved with 
paramilitarism and paramilitary groups. It is necessary to not conflate terrorism and 
militarism: although their means -violence- might appear to be similar, their ends and 
methods vary greatly, so both phenomena cannot be strictly compared. On the one hand, 
terrorism is defined, very simply, as any violent act aiming to disrupt any given social 
order, affecting the distribution of power and creating a state of panic in the general 
population (Reinares, 2005). In order for an act to be considered terrorist, it is necessary 
that there is a conflict between asymmetric structures, in which the state is the powerful 
one, while the terrorist group remains powerless yet violent. On the other hand, militarism 
is a much broader concept, insofar as it refers to the weight of the military in any given 
society (Soto, 1997). 
In their work “Terrorist emotives”, Cottee and Hayward (2011) reflect on 
explanations for terrorism through the feelings that such acts cause the terrorists to 
experience. Following Katz’s seductions of crime (1988), terrorists’ feelings are a driver 
for their behavior, since those feelings allow them to make sense of their lives. Terrorism 
is a way to live less ordinary lives, which is as important a reason as the political one that 
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drives the actions (Cottee and Hayward, 2011). Thus, there are three main categories of 
emotives that drive terrorists to engage with such action: desire for excitement, desire for 
ultimate meaning and desire for glory. Only the two first concepts are of use for the 
present research, since Slovenskí Branci cannot be categorized as a terrorist group. In that 
sense and taking into account all the differences between terrorist groups and Slovenskí 
Branci, desire for excitement and ultimate meaning were found during the present 
research. 
 
5.1.Enjoyment of military and belonging 
The most common motivations for joining Slovenskí Branci can be categorized in 
two ways. The first category referred to by recruits is the enjoyment of the military and 
the activities undertaken. Recruits share a taste for the military; uniforms and weapons 
make them feel stronger or, in Kraska’s terms (1996), show that we cannot escape the 
“habitus of violence” (Kraska, 1996:423). In other terms, the desire for excitement 
(Cottee and Hayward, 2011) has an important role. The motivation for involvement in 
this specific case is the appeal of violence itself. Violence makes us face our own 
humanity in the sense that we get to see real flesh and blood, going beyond the screen 
where we usually experience such sensations (Cottee and Hayward, 2011). This is also 
seen in a different setting, such as the Korengal Valley in Afghanistan. The documentary 
with the same name (Junger, 2014) and the previous film, Restrepo (Junger, 2010), shed 
light on the experience of war for the American soldiers that lived and fought in that 
valley, which is also the case for the recruits when carrying out shooting training:11  
                                                 
11 I experienced and analyzed the situation following auto-ethnography methods. For a detailed reading 
on experiencing militarism, see Kraska (1996). On auto-ethnography, see Ellis et al. (2011). I shall not go 
into detail here due to space constraints. 
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“The recruits tell me that, while shooting, they feel the adrenaline and 
the stress pressuring them. They have to focus on the task because they 
do not want anyone to be hurt.” (Fieldwork notes, Zirany, June 2017) 
Although in Slovenskí Branci there is no real exercise of violence, the experience 
is still real due to the attached meaning of the trainings: 
“At first sight they might look like a group of friends doing role play, like 
other groups who dress up in medieval customs and fight each other with 
fake weapons. However, there is a paramount difference here; all those 
exercises are aimed to be executed in real life, they are preparing 
themselves for real combat situations.” (Fieldwork notes, Zirany, June 
2017). 
It is not a game for them, it is a matter of defending their land. Moreover, and in 
relation to the taste for outdoor sports, being in Slovenskí Branci allows the recruits to 
escape their daily routines. 
Apart from that, there is a feeling of belonging to the group, since being part of 
Slovenskí Branci means being part of a greater organization, a group of people with the 
same feelings and values: 
“For him [recruit] Slovenskí Branci is a group of friends with the same 
ideas and perceptions; he says he is shy and non-conforming with the 
mainstream ‘mindset’, so when he first heard of the group via a friend, 
he decided to give it a try.” (Fieldwork notes, Zirany, May 2017) 
  In Young’s terms (1999), we need to search for ontological security and to regain 
control over our lives; we need to believe that we are part of something bigger than 
ourselves. This regaining of control within ontologically insecure worlds can be achieved 
through crime (Hayward, 2002), once anger due to economic insecurity and relative 
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deprivation has been added to the equation (Young, 2003). It is posited here that this can 
also be achieved through “deviant activities”, inasmuch as they represent a danger to the 
state. This could be the case of Slovenskí Branci: 12 
“When asked about the reasons that led to the foundation of Slovenskí 
Branci, he [NK] believes that RK was angry at his generation because 
they [men] give themselves to decadency and immorality; they do not 
have respect for the elderly, guys dress up as ‘bisexuals’ and they ‘even 
fuck with each other, the guys’, says with face of disgust.” (Fieldwork 
notes, Zirany, June 2017). 
By joining Slovenskí Branci, the recruits may feel that they have some kind of 
control over their lives and that they are “fighting for the right cause” (Cottee and 
Hayward, 2011) when they oppose other ways of understanding sexuality, morality or 
nationalism, all of which contradict the ideas of people in Slovenskí Branci: 
“In a way, we [Slovenskí Branci] exist in order to provide the right 
morality to all those who train with us, so the more people we train, the 
better for the country” (Fieldwork notes, Zirany, June 2017) 
At the same time, they are part of an organization that fulfills an essential task for 
individuals (van Marle and Maruna, 2010): defending culture as a means to manage the 
terror that stems from the ontological insecurity we are forced to face. 
 
5.2.Nationalism and ultimate meaning 
The second category of motivations refers to the love for the country and its 
traditions. Young (2003) posits that globalization, an integral part of a late modern 
                                                 
12 Even though there are not as many new recruits per day as the last year, the number of people involved 
is still growing (personal communication NK, instructor in Slovenskí Branci). 
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society, leads to a diminishing of cultural differences, which has raised discontent among 
nations. Nations have been manufactured as cohesive communities that share values, 
language or traditions (Anderson, 2006). The diminishing of cultural differences might 
be a stress factor, leading to an identity crisis within the nation. Besides, as a taken-for-
granted social institution, the nation inspires self-sacrificing love and is able, therefore, 
to ask for the sacrifice of the individuals in order to protect it. Here, sacrificing one's life 
for the nation, even if in symbolic terms as is the case in Slovenskí Branci, inasmuch as 
they are preparing themselves for war, is an act to protect one’s culture, to defend those 
who likewise believe that culture gives us meaning, casting off the doubts about one’s 
self-identity.13  
“Young people like me are not led to any feeling of patriotism from the 
state or any kind of connection with the state. In Slovakia there’s this new 
attitude spreading, and I believe it’s not just in Slovakia, but also in EU 
and the rest of the world; the attitude of egocentrism, where young people 
don’t really care about their country, they don’t care about where they’re 
coming from and they just want to get as much money as possible and 
kind of take care of themselves, rather than care for what’s gonna happen 
with the country.” (interview RK, Slovenskí Branci founder, Bratislava, 
June 2017). 
RK posited in the interview that Slovenskí Branci is needed in Slovakia to lead 
the youth towards the nation and to care for the country, which has been abandoned 
because of a number of factors, such as, consumerism, multiculturalism and migration. 
                                                 
13 Furthermore, following Gerwarth and Horne (2011), nationalist paramilitarism was used as a means to 
reclaim the land by peasants in France and other countries after the Great War. Based on local defense 
and patriotism, the same concept used by Slovenskí Branci, paramilitarism becomes a way to claim 
possession of land that might have been impaired by the changing conditions of society. Excluding the 
differences between society after the First World War and the late modern society of the XXI century, 
paramilitarism seems to be a response to turbulent epochs. 
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Therefore, the nation, understood in the sense of traditional Slovak values, needs to be 
protected. 
This paramount task of defense of the land can be framed in the desire for ultimate 
meaning of Cottee and Hayward (2011). Just as terrorism becomes a source of identity 
for members of terrorist groups, since they adopt and construct their own image, the same 
happens for recruits in a paramilitary group. Nationalism is, then, a big narrative to 
understand their place in the world. When fighting to defend the sacred and their land, 
terrorists are part of something greater than themselves. Moreover, terrorists also fight for 
their comrades, not only due to political reasons. Thus, Slovenskí Branci, as an 
organization, provides its members with the ultimate purpose of defending the nation. 
Nationalism becomes the ultimate meaning for the recruits, who believe that Slovakia 
needs to be defended from its enemies. Nationalism becomes a great narrative (Anderson, 
2006), which provides people with life meaning and purpose. However, such a purpose 
can only be achieved against an enemy that needs to be dealt with.  
Thirdly, the politicization of the army is referred to by some recruits as making 
them refuse to join the professional army. This politicization means the use of the national 
army to pursue NATO goals, mainly. The nation, as a super-self, worthy of dying for, 
cannot be subordinated to other organizations: 
“NC entered Slovenskí Branci because of family tradition, as he puts it; 
his father fought in Serbia and he has always liked the military, although 
he does not want to join the army because he thinks it is not what it should 
be. This same thought is shared by another recruit, who likes the military 
and, therefore, joined Slovenskí Branci, but feels that the army is too 
politicized.” (Fieldwork notes, Zirany, May 2017). 
“And then, of course, the military, or regular Slovak army was ended or 
finished and we become as a member of the NATO (…), so we got 
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professional army; it counts nowadays, maybe, somewhere around 
10.000 or 11.000 soldiers, but I think 3.000 are really ready for some 
action. (…) The others, you know, kitchen, administration. And we 
recognize that this is not good because, of course, our system of  seal 
defense… not only from the military point of view, but the point of view 
of civilians. It’s gradually decayed and nowadays it’s completely 
missing” (AP, Slovenskí Branci instructor, interview, Bratislava, June 
2017). 
This third motive is linked to the fourth and most important: distrust in the 
government. This is a widespread feeling in Slovak society due to corruption scandals in 
the national government.14 Recruits refer to this problem in terms of “we need to do 
something if the government does not”.15 
“In an informal conversation with RC [recruit] some days before this 
training, he told me that most youths in Slovakia do not feel anything for 
the country because they do not trust the government. For people in SB 
[Slovenskí Branci] this is slightly different: they do not fully trust the 
government, but they are loyal to the nation” (Fieldwork notes, Zirany, 
June 2017). 
Rosenbaum and Sedeberg (1974) stated that vigilantism is more likely to appear 
where the state is seen as tied up by its own rules, a state of affairs Nivette (2016) referred 
to as conditions of perceived “statelessness”. Recruits believe that the state is not capable 
of dealing with all the problems of the people and the state itself so, in order to defend 
the system, they may have to step in and “do something”. Although Slovakia cannot be 
                                                 
14 Elena Gallova. Expert on migration policies and social researcher in Slovakia at CVEK (Center for 
Research on Ethnicity and Culture). Interview, Bratislava, July 2017. 
15 Fieldwork notes, Zirany, May 2017. 
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considered as a failed state following international standards, for paramilitary groups like 
Slovenskí Branci, the perception of a failing state is enough. 
“He [NK, instructor] says that their [Slovenskí Branci’s] main aim is to 
operate like the National Guard does in the US; they aim to be deployed 
whenever the state, the police or another state body requires them” 
(Fieldwork notes, Zirany, June 2017). 
The absence of previous social institutions and metanarratives, caused by the 
transition to capitalism, has left national identity in a void. In this void, Slovakia could be 
considered a failed state by the recruits, who feel forced to take action for their country. 
In fifth and last place, linked to the concept of local patriotism, the protection of 
the country and family is an important reason to join. Every recruit must be ready to 
protect their relatives and friends, as well as their neighborhood and city. The following 
quote is from the interview with AP, one of the main instructors of Slovenskí Branci: 
“I live close to Bratislava and I know lot of people. So, let’s say, literally 
saying, this is my universe; I got kids here, family here, my grandparents, 
also wife, wife’s grandparents. We know each other. In case that there 
will be any attack or any conflict, I will professionally defend, you know, 
myself, my family, my home, my house, my village, my local area.” 
(interview AP, Slovenskí Branci instructor, Bratislava, June 2017). 
Recruits may also teach some skills to those close to them in order to show them 
how to protect themselves, as they perceive a potential threat to their way of life in the 
elements of multiculturalism: 
“I teach my wife to handle weapons because it’s useful. There’s fear of 
Muslims because we live in a cross-house, typical Slovak, and Muslims 
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don’t like crosses. And with all the refugees going on… they could attack 
us” (interview AP, Slovenskí Branci instructor, Bratislava, June 2017). 
Gerwarth and Horne (2011) describe something similar to this concept of local 
patriotism in post-Revolutionary Russia in 1918. In both, Bolshevik and whites, 
paramilitary groups were formed to defend the local areas from the threats of the other 
side. This was also documented in France (Gerwarth and Horne, 2011) in the same period, 
where anti-Communist groups were created. Moreover, this has also been studied in 
Nigeria (Pratten, 2008), where vigilante activities have added meaning for young men 
who participate in the night shifts. It follows from this analysis, then, that preoccupation 
for “the local”, the neighborhood or village is a constant in vigilantism.16 
 
6. Discussion and conclusions 
Vigilantism, linked to paramilitary groups, seems to have been useful in 
convulsive times. As seen, from France to Russia, ranging through America, Africa and 
Eastern Europe, paramilitary groups have sprung up in order to combat a perceived threat 
against the social group or social order. In Slovakia, people in Slovenskí Branci believe 
that the nation is endangered due to a number of factors, from consumerism to the 
breakdown of traditional values caused by multiculturalism. Therefore, in conditions of 
perceived statelessness and unwillingness of the state to tackle those perceived social 
problems, Slovenskí Branci has a role to play. Whether Slovakia is really in danger of 
losing its traditional values, whatever they might be, is not relevant for this study. What 
                                                 
16 As Zizumbo-Colunga (2010) explains in the case of Mexico, an important factor for this to happen is 
that people in the village or surroundings protected by the vigilante group have to think likewise, in order 
for the group to be totally accepted and endorsed. This has also been explored by several authors in 
different settings, for example, Gitlitz and Rojas (1983) in Perú; Abrahams (1987) in Tanzania; Doty 
(2007) in USA; Martin (2012) in South Africa. 
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matters is that people in Slovenskí Branci are ready to fight if they need to. Notably, there 
has not yet been any reported violence from the group. 
In the context of a late-modern society, self and group identities become hard to 
define. Hence, initiatives like Slovenskí Branci appear useful to those who need 
reassurance in their daily lives. These groups become something to hold onto when there 
is nothing settled and security is at stake. Slovenskí Branci has been defined as a threat 
due to their far-right-wing discourse and their vigilantism on disadvantaged social groups 
like migrants or Roma people. Therefore, although there has not been any real violence 
carried out by the group, they still ought to be considered when talking about the far-right 
in Europe. 
 
7. Epilogue 
It is the first training session I attend, a bright sunny day. It has already been a 
long day of marching and exercises in the woods, digging trenches and learning how to 
protect people against chemical and biological weapons. We get to the final exercise after 
a short walk; a road block and car search. This exercise is the last and the conscripts are 
tired, so they mess around with the car until NK and his second reprimand the group and 
call to order. Three kids descend the road close to us by bike and shout “Allahu akbar” 
when one of them falls. Rapidly, some of the recruits go to assist them and in the end the 
kids stay with the group until the session finishes because they are curious about the guns 
and the exercises. When we finish, the kids leave on their bikes with stickers of Slovenskí 
Branci, their curiosity satisfied, and playing a cheerful soldier game. The seed of the 
military and protection of the nation has been planted; whether it flourishes or not depends 
on the kids, their families and the evolution of the country itself. 
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